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Abstract This chapter presents several of the dominant ideas and intellectual debates 
about human beauty from archaic Greece to early Christianity. At issue are 
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Around 500 BCE, on a couch at a male-only drinking party in Athens, you might have 
heard a young man sing: 
I wish I were a beautiful ivory lyre, 
and that beautiful boys would bring me to the Dionysian dance. 
Not to be outdone, in chimes his friend: 
I wish I were a big, beautiful piece of unsmelted gold,  
and that a beautiful woman would wear me, one who made her mind pure.1  
(Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae 15.695c–d = Poetae Melici Graeci fr. 900–1) 
 
1 Translations are my own unless otherwise noted, based upon the text of standard editions.   
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These wishes are fun and fanciful. But their desire for beauty is perfectly serious. 
Throughout antiquity, much like today, beauty is central to a good life. The paradigm of 
beauty is not such objects as lyres and jewelry, of course, but human beings. Nevertheless, 
these wishes reveal why beauty matters to a whole life: one aspires, not simply to be 
around beautiful people, but to be beautiful oneself. This chapter presents several 
dominant ideas and intellectual debates about what this means from archaic Greece to 
early Christianity. The central conviction is that ideas of beauty are ideals of character, 
ideals of who one should be and how one should live. However, as the dueling couplets 
above already suggest, these ideals are constantly contested. Questions concerning three 
related issues govern the discussion:  
1. The nature of beauty. What makes human beings beautiful? What or whose features 
are prized, by whom, and why? Are these features of the body, the soul, or both? At 
stake here are general ideas of what it is to be human but also specific distinctions of 
sex, gender, and class. 
2. The value of beauty. Are beautiful people good? Does beauty reveal virtue or conceal 
vice? Does the experience of beauty in others or oneself make one’s life better or 
worse? At stake here are ideas of the good life or happiness.  
3. The relationship between human and divine. Does human beauty derive from divine 
beauty? Does being beautiful make someone (more) divine? Does the experience of 
beauty help or hinder proper relations with the gods or God? At stake here are ideas 
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of the order of reality, how one can know it, and the ideal of becoming godlike 
between Greco-Roman philosophy and early Christianity. 
It will orient readers to bear these three issues in mind and to note how they come 
together for some thinkers and come apart for others. While I intimate how and why this 
is so in the case of some, I have necessarily emphasized how broader patterns of thought 
develop and transform as philosophers and poets engage with one another and their 
cultural contexts. Since this is a conversation constructed through literary sources 
composed mainly by elite males, it will be worthwhile to consider the extent to which the 
following ideas regulate the practices of beautification discussed in later chapters.  
1. Epic and Archaic Greek Poetry 
The earliest Greek literature presents human beauty as a superhuman condition. From 
Homeric epic through archaic poetry, beauty among human beings signals a divine 
presence or godlike status. The gods are paragons of beauty, none more so than 
Aphrodite, goddess of beauty and sex. Human beauty is conceived relative to and often 
as a gift from them. Reflected chiefly by the noun kallos (Konstan 2014), beauty has the 
character of an independent substance. Gods apply beauty onto mortals like smiths apply 
gold and silver onto armor or like one puts on makeup or fragrant perfume (Odyssey 
18.190–4; cf. 6.234–5, 8.457–60; Iliad 6.156–7; Hesiod, Works and Days 65–6). Sometimes this 
divine dispensation steels mortals against difficult situations, as when Athena pours 
grace (charis) upon Telemachus before he faces a council (Odyssey 2.12–3) or enhances 
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Penelope’s beautiful features (prosōpata kala) with a balm of immortal beauty (kalleï 
ambrosiō(i)) to make her taller, grander, and fairer before confronting the suitors in her 
palace (18.192–6).2 Height, fullness, and luminosity are telltale marks of beauty in Homer, 
as throughout antiquity. And the suitors’ response is paradigmatic. Weakened in the 
knees and wishing to bed Penelope, their hearts are enchanted by erotic desire, erōs.  
Axiomatic to ancient Greek and Roman thought is that beauty elicits erotic desire. 
Erotic desire is an intense, passionate longing to have closer and fuller contact with 
something or someone. One can have this desire for such things as food or drink or for 
people in non-sexual ways, for example in forms of admiration. But the paradigm is, as 
above, sexual attraction to a person whom one finds beautiful (kalon).3 The experience is 
torturous, a maddening mix of pleasure and pain that drives someone out of their wits, 
beyond social and ethical norms, and often to their ruin, as the chorus of Sophocles’ 
Antigone later warns (781–800). The whole mind and body are captivated, yet this 
response often begins with the sight of beauty; a common term for physical beauty, eidos, 
means ‘appearance’ and is etymologically linked with verbs of seeing.4 This sight, too, 
reveals the heightened presence and power of the gods. For the sight of beauty is at its 
peak an erotic experience of wonder (thauma) in which the divine appears present. When 
 
2 Charis is closely related, sometimes equated, to kallos: e.g., Odyssey 6.237, 23.156–62. For 
Homeric terminology of beauty, see Konstan 2014: 35–43 and Shakeshaft 2019. 
3 See further the contribution of Courtney Ward to this volume. 




in Homer’s Odyssey, Odysseus emerges from a river freshly washed, his hair curled and 
build increased by Athena’s beautifying grace, he looks so much like a god that Nausicaa, 
herself lovely like an immortal goddess (6.16), gazes awestruck and longs for a husband 
just like him (6.229–45). Similarly, in the Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite (5.84–106), Anchises 
is seized with erotic desire as he wonders at the goddess, glimpsing divinity in her size, 
shining golden earrings, and elaborate dress “more radiant than the brightness of fire” 
(5.86)–an effective costume if a poor disguise by which Aphrodite seduces Anchises as a 
maiden. The wondrous and radiant sight of beauty manifests the divine, paradoxically, 
in the mortal realm (Neer 2010: 58–68). 
The godlike status of beauty indicates also human excellence or virtue (aretē). The 
seductive force of beauty, however, complicates evaluations of female beauty. For males 
and females alike, beauty belongs especially to youth. For both, beauty indicates 
gendered ideals of virtue that define what it is to be a good man or a good woman. Yet a 
woman’s beauty is her defining power, akin for one male poet to a man’s intelligence 
(Anacreon fr. 24). Many men imagine that such beauty threatens their power to rule 
themselves and others.  
So it is that kallos in Homer applies to men and women in equal number, though 
not at all equally. Gods take beautiful young men to Olympus ‘because of their beauty’ 
for their own pleasure (Iliad 6.156, 20.235; Odyssey 15.251). Yet there is seldom hint of 
diminished agency, deception, or disaster. Not so with female beauty. A common pattern 
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is to blame female beauty for causing devastation, whether in one’s life or on a political 
or cosmic scale. The trope begins with the mythical judgment of Paris, which provokes 
the Trojan War.5 Paris is tasked to decide who among Hera, Athena, and Aphrodite is 
most beautiful. The title presupposes that beauty is not merely ‘in the eye of the beholder’ 
but a feature of things, actually there to be discerned by competent beholders like 
beautiful Paris. Tellingly, each goddess covets the title, so essential is beauty to 
femininity. Thus, Hera and Athena compete on Aphrodite’s ground. In Apollodorus of 
Athens’ telling (Epitome 3.2), the goddesses offer bribes, kingship and martial victory 
respectively, which proclaim the superior value and beauty of their special spheres of 
life.6 Yet these are no match for Aphrodite’s offer: the most beautiful woman, Helen, 
daughter of Zeus. Helen is married to Menelaus, however, and so must be seduced or 
‘taken’ by Paris, a deed that sets sail a thousand ships at devastating cost to human life. 
Whether or to what extent Helen deserves blame for acting voluntarily remains 
controversial within the epic cycle and throughout classical Greek history, rhetoric, and 
tragedy (Blondell 2013). But the lesson is supposed to be clear: beautiful women bring 
disaster. The result is the fundamentally ambivalent attitude that female beauty is 
desirable yet feared for undesirable consequences. This attitude may extend to how 
 
5 Herodotus’ variation seems to indict more so the rapacious desire of men, tracing the Persian 
Wars to King Candaules’ demand that Gyges see his beautiful wife naked (Histories 1.8–9). 
6 If the great value and contested terms of beauty do not explain why Hera and Athena willingly 
compete on Aphrodite’s terrain, as Blondell 2013: 2 argues, the story might seem comical. So, 
Euripides’ Trojan Women and Konstan 2014: 66.  
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women under patriarchy view themselves. Beauty becomes, in a double bind, an index 
of ethical praise and blame.  
The worry that female beauty causes harm, not just as the object of erotic desire, 
but through the desire and agency of women animates the myth of Pandora in Hesiod. 
To punish humanity after Prometheus stole fire from the gods, divine smith Hephaestus 
fashions the first female, Pandora. A “beautiful evil” (kalon kakon, Theogony 585), Pandora 
is gifted with human speech, strength, and a deceitful mind with which to use these 
cunningly. Her cunning intelligence signals that beauty may deceive, such that men may 
“delight while embracing their own undoing” (Works and Days 58). Yet this cunning 
partly constitutes female beauty.7 One focal point of Pandora’s beauty is her power of 
voice; her throat is adorned with necklaces by Grace and Persuasion. Another is her 
radiant hair, crowned and covered with flowers atop her veiled face (Theogony 576–80; 
Works and Days 65–76). The veil signifies a virgin on the cusp of marriage (parthenos), 
whose liminal status connotes and compounds anxiety about women in general [Fig. 
1.1].8 The concern is not only that desiring Pandora causes one to lose self-control (as when 
 
7 Compare Hera’s ‘deception of Zeus’ (Iliad 14.214–21). There is overlap here with one strand of 
thought that applies also to males, which locates beauty in a crafty or variable (poikilos) character. 
Odysseus is one exemplar. See further Grand-Clément 2015. 
8 A telling detail of the Theogony version is that Pandora becomes grammatically feminine, after 
being described in neuter terms, just as she is presented to gods and mortal men. But it is she who 
delights in her adornment at this moment (agallomenēn, 587). The same verb (agallomai) describes 
Hector and Paris taking pride in their appearance (Iliad 6.506–11). The related adjective, aglaios, 
connotes the radiant beauty of youth.  
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a smitten Epimetheus takes her into his house and she opens a jar of evils onto the world; 
94–104). The concern is also to control the desires of desirable women themselves. 
Primarily at issue are sexual desires, to ensure that each woman bears children to only 
one man, whose good name depends on his lineage; however, Pandora’s curiosity brings 
desires for knowledge also to the fore. Unsurprisingly, social and legal restrictions on 
archaic and classical Greek women revolve around Hesiod’s two focal points. A woman’s 
persuasive voice is silenced in public discourse; her hair, face, eyes–her own gaze–are 
veiled, her bodily movements hidden from public view (Pomeroy 1975; Winkler 1990). In 
the name of self-control or modesty (sophrosynē), “a good woman knows her place and 
stays inside as much as possible” (Blondell 2013: 22). 
While this misogynistic treatment of beauty remains all too familiar, the emphasis 
on male beauty in ancient Greece from Homer onward may surprise. But these are two 
sides of the same coin. Whereas in the imaginations of men female beauty bears harm, 
male beauty bears signs of ‘the good,’ and this in related ethical and social senses. Male 
beauty is taken to manifest the virtue of the ruling elite, the warrior-chieftain or ‘good 
man’ (agathos). Such men aim to have their honour (timē) recognized and, above all, to 
win glory (kleos) in battle. This is an ideal at once of body and mind. To this end courage 
is principal. Its physical expressions, great size and strength, make a handsome frame 
(Donlan 1999: 23, 106). Thus Achilles, ‘best of the Acheans’ and most beautiful (kallistos) 
of all men at Troy (Iliad 2.673–4), boasts how large and beautiful he is (21.108–10). 
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Agamemnon, leader of the Achaeans and also ‘best’ among them, is so beautiful (kalos), 
mighty, noble, and tall that Helen knows he must be a king even though she has no idea 
who is he (3.166–70). The best men look the part, the more conspicuously with long hair, 
beardless chins, and purple robes (Archilochus fr. 60D). A similar aesthetic, though with 
dark, thick, and curly hair and a voluptuous vitality, marks the ideal elite male in ancient 
Mesopotamian art and literature (Winter 1995). 
The ethical and social complexion of these ideas raises a fundamental 
methodological question: how can one illuminate the contours of ancient conceptions of 
beauty? Indeed, what would show that one is inquiring into the history of the concept of 
beauty at all? It risks anachronism to conclude that ancient thinkers possess some concept 
simply because we can understand their patterns of thought in terms of it. But should it 
be necessary to appeal to that concept, the conclusion would be safer. Such is the case 
with the noun kallos, for which the translation beauty seems unavoidable. The difficulty, 
of course, is understanding what beauty was for ancient Greeks–a difficulty exacerbated 
by the fact that we hardly have a perspicuous grasp of our own concept. The issue is well 
brought out by the fusion of aesthetic, ethical, and social dimensions of the adjective kalos, 
noted a moment ago. The adjective praises the attractive appearance of bodies, well-
composed artefacts, political customs, and virtuous character and actions. We might not 
call all these beautiful. But what follows from this? A dominant view throughout the last 
century has been that kalos does not reflect well the concept of beauty and means 
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primarily what is fine, admirable, or noble (notably Croce [1911] 1995: 156–66; Dover 1974: 
70; Konstan 2014). On this view, Achilles–who is superlatively kalos but never attributed 
kallos–is likely boasting about his nobility, not his beauty. However, it is questionable 
whether attributions of beauty may be so sharply distinguished from admirable qualities 
or symbols of status, either in antiquity or today.9 As students of antiquity navigate the 
peculiarities of another intellectual and cultural context, they may also become more self-
conscious of their own.  
If words offer initial insight into ancient Greek ideas, then, it is necessary to look 
further to how concepts function within a constellation of ideas and cultural practices. A 
modern reader for whom beauty connotes femininity might suppose this to be the reason 
why Achilles is never attributed kallos whereas Paris is. Paris’ lovely features match his 
passion for sensuous beauty found in sex, elaborate clothes, perfumes, and home décor 
(Iliad 3.340–454, 6.313–24), a passion that keeps company with cowardice. As Paris flees 
from battle, Hector imagines the Achaeans laughing, having thought Paris valiant on 
account of his beauty (3.43–5). But if his good looks make him look better than he is, Paris 
is the exception that proves the rule that male beauty manifests virtue according to the 
 
9 See further Nietzsche’s remarks in On the Genealogy of Morality I.5 ([1887] 1994) and Lissarague 
1999 on kalos-inscriptions. On the contemporary front, Wolf 1991 remains indispensable. 
Murdoch 1970, Nehamas 2007, and Kraut 2013 draw relevant insights from Plato and Aristotle 
into ethical dimensions of beauty.  
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Homeric scheme of values.10 In the context of those values, the contrast between Paris 
and Achilles–or the noun kallos and adjective kalos–is a contrast not between beauty and 
masculine virtue but between two ethically significant ways for a man to be beautiful. 
Males are admired for their beauty, indeed erotically. The difference made by sex and 
gender is that male beauty is not only less problematical but less sexualized. An amorous 
gaze at Achilles is less obviously for the sake of sex than in the case of his female 
counterparts. It is more obviously for the sake of emulation.  
 The ideal for which one emulates heroic beauty is glory (kleos). To live for the sake 
of glory is to die courageously, a beautiful or noble death. A stunning strand of Homeric 
poetry, which lends heroes lustre, is the aestheticization of death and dying. Whether this 
glorifies war, transmutes its horrors, or condemns it by bringing humanity to otherwise 
unknown figures, as when Simoeisius is cut down like a handsome black poplar (Iliad 
4.442–3), beauty crucially functions to preserve the deceased body from decay so that the 
hero’s identity and deeds may be remembered by future generations (Vernant 1991: ch. 
2).11 As Trojan king Priam puts the heroic ideal, “For a young man all is seemly [pant’ 
epeoiken] when he is cut down in battle and torn with sharp bronze and lies there dead, 
and though dead, still all that shows about him is beautiful [panta de kala... phanēē(i)]” 
 
10 For this physiognomy, witness also Thersites: the ugliest at Troy, bowlegged, bald, and beaten 
for criticizing the system of honour (Iliad 2.211–77). 
11 Compare Euphorbus cut down like a blossoming olive tree (Iliad 17.51–6); Patroclus’ shining 
body before death (16.805); Hector’s corpse (22.370–1, 24.757–8).  
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(Iliad 22.71–3). The corpse shines splendidly, signaling in death an outstanding life that, 
in the archaic imagination, will therefore be recounted in beautiful song. The notion of a 
beautiful death would retain some appeal in various forms for centuries, whether in 
elegies of Spartan poet Tyrtaeus (10.21–32), Pericles’ funeral oration for fallen Athenian 
soldiers in 431 BCE (Thucydides 2.35–46; Loraux 1986), or Tacitus’ serene portrayal of the 
suicide of Roman philosopher-statesman Seneca in 65 CE (Annals 15.60–4). [Fig. 1.2] 
If this notion is not fully intelligible to us as a notion of beauty, there is at least this 
structural similarity. Like ‘our’ modern concept of beauty, the concept of beauty in 
antiquity is constantly contested. One influential dissent comes from female lyric poet 
Sappho of Mytilene, composing on the island of Lesbos. One poem begins by criticizing 
Homeric values under the banner of beauty: “Some men say an army of horse and some 
men say an army on foot ǀ and some men say an army of ships is the most beautiful thing 
ǀ on the black earth. But I say it is ǀ what you love” (fr. 16.1–4).12 The content and structure 
of the concept of beauty has changed. First, what men find beautiful is subsumed under 
the personal authority of a female lover: most beautiful, ‘I say,’ is what one loves. The 
assertion is quite general: the world of war is for men, too, a field of erotic attractions. But 
the speaker’s insistent ‘I’, second, personalizes the experience of beauty and explains 
what is (most) beautiful on this basis. To Helen’s desire for Paris she compares her 
longing for her absent beloved, whose radiant face and movements she wishes to see far 
 
12 Translations of Sappho belong to Carson 2003. 
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more than chariots and foot-soldiers (l. 9 ff). The poem, like much of Sappho’s surviving 
poetry, illustrates the point that, if beauty is to be determined by a psychological response 
to a beloved, then the primary way to understand beauty is to analyze its effects from a 
first-personal perspective. This is why Sappho portrays intimately how love feels in time, 
its present pangs of sorrow, sweet memories, hopeful longings. Her often-imitated 
fragment 31, for instance, turns from the sight of a man who “seems to me equal to gods” 
to throw a jealous lover self-consciously back onto herself: “drumming fills ears ǀ and 
cold sweat holds me and shaking ǀ ... dead–or almost I seem to me.” (fr. 31.9–12). Earlier 
scholars were tempted to take this self-conscious, assertive voice to express Sappho’s own 
passions for women. But such personal expressions are less certainly biographical facts 
than attempts to reclaim through public performance the private space of women against 
dominant cultural values (Winkler 1990: ch. 6; Kurke 2007: 158–68). Who defines beauty, 
and how, is crucial to this political contest.    
Still, the Homeric notion that physical beauty reflects high social status and ethical 
worth sets the pattern of reflection in antiquity. Centuries later, a character in Chariton’s 
Greek novel Callirhoe expects only a free person to have a beautiful body (2.1.5), and as 
late as 377 CE the orator Themistius exclaims that the beauty (kallos) of the young Roman 
emperor Gratian could render even a barbarian beautiful (kalos, 13.166c).13 This pattern 
 




emerges, of course, from elite authors. But it is not automatic. It begins with a defensive 
attempt by aristocrats in sixth-century BCE Greece to elevate themselves above wealthy 
lower classes by cultivating a luxurious lifestyle meant to display what it is to be 
‘beautiful-and-good’ or ‘splendid-and-upright.’ This is original role of the kalos kagathos, 
a gentleman whose excellent character is expressed through his attractive physique, 
graceful habits, and participation in cultured activities, such as donning a Persian parasol 
or drinking with his fellows at a symposium (Donlan 1973; Kurke 1992) [Fig. 1.3]. In this 
agonistic sociopolitical context belong the performance of Sappho’s poetry but also those 
sympotic drinking songs that rank beauty among the greatest goods in life, even second-
best to health (Poetae Melici Graeci fr. 890). So do Pindar’s odes to victorious athletes, 
which unite their beauty to virtue in terms of strength (Isthmian 7.22), youth (Olympian 
9.94), manliness (Nemean 3.19–20) and, of course, the glorious feats that his beautiful 
poetry aims to ‘mirror’ and immortalize (6.28–30; 7.14–6).  
One question forced by these conceptual movements is whether beauty is a 
product of fortune or cultivation, good luck or good character. Aristocrats could help 
themselves to both answers. On the one hand, they could restrict beauty to their birth 
right. But this thought risks pulling beauty in the opposite direction as virtue, which 
demands intentional action. Even the disaffected aristocrat personified in the poetry of 
Theognis laments that beauty and virtue have come apart, both falling to but a happy few 
(ll. 933–4). By the time we come to Aristotle, it is somewhat commonplace to consider 
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physical beauty a good ‘external’ to the soul and its activity, albeit one without which it 
is harder to live well (Nicomachean Ethics 1099a3–b4; cf. Plato, Philebus 265b; Xenophon, 
Memorabilia 4.2.34). However, physical beauty more usually carries psychological 
significance as the result of voluntary effort. The paradigm is athletics. While some 
beauty contests, the kallisteia, may have involved little more than posing, in contests of 
manliness (euandria) or fitness (euexia) and athletics more generally, strength, speed, size, 
and well-proportioned muscles still signify virtues, such as courage or self-control, 
needed to sculpt and train the body in specific ways (Athenaeus 565f, 609f–10b; Crowther 
1985; Gherchanoc 2016). Here, on the other hand too, aristocrats could invoke self-serving 
standards. These virtues are expected of free citizens and, to embody them, one needs 
leisure to work out at the gymnasium. The idea that athletic beauty concerns virtuous 
character long endures in classical Greek ethics and Roman philosophical reflection on 
gladiatorial games (Scanlon 2002: 205; Reid 2011).  
2. From Classical Greece to Imperial Rome 
The ideas of beauty surveyed so far suffuse and shape social, political, and intellectual 
life in classical Greece, yet the rise of philosophy introduces new questions and problems. 
The conservative streak can be seen in the comedies of Aristophanes since they air, if 
challenge, cultural norms before a broad democratic audience. There we continue to find 
social and ethical meanings of beautiful bodies. Attractive young women have attention 
paid to tender breasts and fair skin; this last is a sign of a respectable aristocratic life spent 
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indoors. For young men, it is broad chests and shoulders, large buttocks, and 
complexions bright from exercise, not pale from too much studying inside. Tall stature 
signifies high status. Small genitals, a notable feature of classical Greek sculpture (see 
ahead to Fig. 1.4), reflects a modest sexual appetite, not the size of one’s anatomy, real or 
ideal (Aristophanes, Clouds 1010–19; Robson 2013). At the same time, classical Greek 
philosophers transform the concept in ways that become decisive for the history of 
thinking about beauty in the west. None is more influential or innovative than Plato. 
While preserving the link between beauty and virtue, Plato shifts the basis of both from 
social status to a novel picture of a good human life and its relation to a divine 
metaphysical order.  
Throughout the Platonic dialogues, an encounter with human beauty is a first and 
often necessary step in learning to live well. Frequently Plato’s character Socrates engages 
handsome young men to inquire into values, such as moderation (Charmides) or 
friendship (Lysis), taking their beauty to bear promise of intellectual virtue. This is a twist 
on and critique of the convention of aristocratic men courting adolescent males with a 
supposed view to their civic education. More significant than how Plato dramatizes 
philosophy is how he constructs it. The love of wisdom, philosophia, is an erotic love of 
beauty. To awaken this love, in the Republic, children must be raised to admire and 
emulate the beauty of a virtuous person. Such a person, Socrates suggests, exudes 
gracefulness and order in habits, speech, and body, “the most beautiful sight for anyone 
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who can see” (Republic 402d). This sensibility needs to be educated, however, and 
rationality nurtured, by being socialized into a beautiful culture that shapes one’s sense 
of what a good life looks like (400e–3a; Richardson Lear 2006). Beauty is not merely the 
start, but a means and an end of philosophical progress toward virtue and knowledge. 
Philosophers love everything beautiful, chiefly the non-sensible ‘form’ of beauty, the 
divine order of which they strive to emulate (Republic 475e–6c, 500a–b). The Symposium 
complements this account with fuller emphasis on human beauty. The sight of a beautiful 
person, whether in body or in soul, inspires our various attempts to become happy and 
perfect our imperfect human nature (Symposium 205a–9e, 215e–17a). If inquisitive and led 
aright, one proceeds from being attracted to one and then all beautiful bodies to care more 
for a beloved’s soul. What makes people better and more beautiful? It is sound political 
practices, bodies of knowledge and, ultimately, virtue through the contemplation of the 
nature of beauty itself (210a–12a).14 Beauty urges one to know more (Nehamas 2007). 
Beautiful people, bodies, souls: how do these relate? Plato distinguishes human 
beings by having a soul–which makes living things alive–that is embodied as well as 
rational. So, a soul ruled by reason is, on the one hand, more beautiful and desirable than 
a beautiful body, indeed sometimes the cause of a beautiful body (Republic 402d, 410c–
 
14 For the many controversies about this passage, see Price 1989: ch. 2, Sheffield 2006: chs. 4–5, 
and Destrée and Giannopoulou 2017. To note but one: my gloss does not presume, as one often 




11e, 444d–e). Only with wisdom and the rest of virtue is bodily beauty beneficial (e.g., 
491c, 591b, 618c–d). On the other hand, despite this distinction, Plato does not reject but 
radically reforms the aristocratic idea that a beautiful body complements and manifests a 
beautiful soul (Charmides 154d). A horrible person may (initially) seem attractive, like the 
stunning yet arrogant statesman Alcibiades. But Plato would agree with his 
contemporary Xenophon that the beauty of virtue “shows through” (diaphainei, 
Memorabilia 3.10.5) bodily actions, rhythms, and postures.15 Beauty of soul is publicly 
visible, not some mysterious ‘inner’ quality. To see this beauty may not be easy, as 
Aristotle says in his qualified defence of natural slavery, though he too assumes that its 
natural index is a beautiful body (Politics 1254b27–39). This shared assumption helps to 
explain why Plato’s most sustained discussion of beauty turns on the whole 
psychosomatic experience of persons in love.  
According to Socrates in the Phaedrus, human beauty can uniquely manifest the 
divine order of reality and reorient how one lives. Of all values, beauty alone is radiant, 
making its appearance immediately manifest in beautiful things. A “godlike” (theoeides) 
face or body that reflects beauty well is therefore for the philosophical initiate an 
awesome sight: like a devotional statue (agalma), the divine presents itself to human 
awareness (Phaedrus 250d–1a). This sight reveals both a glimpse of beauty itself–in which 
 
15 Despite Alcibiades’ portrait of an ugly Socrates within beautiful speeches ‘on the inside’ 
(Symposium 215a–b). See, recently, Boys-Stones 2019.  
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beautiful faces, people, deeds, and other things ‘participate’–and the fact that human 
nature shares in the divine, above all by sharing rational capacities to grasp truth and live 
accordingly. Few enjoy this revelatory experience. Yet it can inspire one to make oneself 
and one’s beloved as godlike as possible by pursuing the beauty of wisdom and a 
philosophical life through friendship together (252d–3b, 255b–6b).16 As in epic and 
archaic poetry, beauty likens human beings to immortal gods; but for Plato, this way lies 
happiness.    
This picture assumes a still closer connection between beauty and goodness 
(Hippias Major 296e–7a; Meno 77b; Philebus 66a–b; Laws 841c). Yet Plato distinguishes these 
values, especially in the psychology of beauty (Barney 2010), and resists reducing beauty 
to some other value or property, whether pleasure, harmony, unity, or appropriateness. 
His dialogues explore facets of the concept yet settle on no definition; Socrates ventures 
in the Phaedo only the ‘safe’ answer that the ‘form of beauty’ makes beautiful things 
beautiful (Phaedo 100d). This overall approach suggests a conviction that brings together 
the rival poles struck by Homer and Sappho: beauty is a real feature of things 
independent of the human mind, but it cannot be comprehended without analyzing what 
it is like to find someone or something beautiful. Both halves of this idea become 
 
16 Excellent studies of these themes include Ferrari 1987: ch. 6, Price 1989: ch. 3, and Richardson 
Lear 2019.  
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contentious in the history of aesthetics. In antiquity, few deny the former. Some pressure 
on the latter may already be felt in Stoicism.  
In what is arguably the first philosophical theory of beauty, the Stoics define 
beauty as summetria, proportion or what came later to be called ‘symmetry.’ Proportion 
had long been associated with beauty, as had related concepts such as appropriateness 
(Greek to prepon; Latin decorum) and order (taxis; ordo). Homeric heroes look ugly when 
they take more than their fair share. Plato, perhaps influenced by Pythagoreans, calls 
people and things beautiful when well-proportioned and measured (Timaeus 69b, 87d–e; 
Philebus 64e; Sophist 235e–6a). Aristotle lists proportion among the main sources of beauty 
(Metaphysics 1078a31–b2; Poetics 1450b36; Topics 116b21; Politics 1326a33), which may 
explain why he rates the bodies of pentathletes, trained for speed and strength, most 
beautiful (Rhetoric 1361b3–12). Yet the Stoics make proportion necessary and sufficient 
for beauty. (Cicero adds pleasant color to the definition: Tusculan Disputations 4.31.) The 
Stoics mean to explain the beauty of anything–indeed, everything, the cosmos–but they 
take their cue from the human case. Their definition follows the Canon of the classical 
Greek sculptor Polyclitus (c. 450 BCE), according to which beauty and perfection in 
sculptures of the human form derive from proportions of body parts to one another and 
to the whole body, of finger to finger, finger to hand, hand to forearm, and so forth. So at 
least the Stoic Chrysippus seems to have understood the sculptor (Galen, De placitis 
Hippocratis et Platonis 5.448); Polyclitus’ artistic principle remains notoriously obscure 
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since surviving copies of the sculpture that exemplified it, the Spearbearer (Doryphoros), 
differ in proportions and suggest a notion of symmetry as counterbalanced forces. In a 
famous Roman copy [Fig. 1.4], the young hero or warrior-athlete holds a spear (now lost) 
in his bent left arm, which is balanced by his straight, weight-bearing right leg just as his 
bent left leg is balanced by his relaxed right arm. Notably, the feet are too big for walking 
and real bodies have no sexy ‘athlete’s girdle’ where the torso meets the hip. These 
observations are helpful reminders that representational and mathematical exactness 
may have been secondary in practice, if not always in theory, to the aim of arousing desire 
and wonder in spectators (Neer 2010: 151–2).  
The Stoic theory, however, concentrates rather less on what beauty does than on 
the claim that beauty consists in certain relations between parts of a structured whole. A 
common analogy is health. Health comes from a balance of elements, the hot, cold, wet, 
and dry. So too bodily beauty comes from a good arrangement of limbs and the beauty 
of a wise person’s soul comes from a coherent and stable set of beliefs (Cicero, Tusculan 
Disputations 4.13.301; Arius Didymus 5b4–5; Stobaeus, Anthology 2.7.5, 2.62.15–63.5). 
These two orders of beauty are not merely analogous. They are continuous with one 
another. One whose mind accords with the rational order of nature will act with an 
appropriateness or seemliness (decorum) that, Cicero states, arouses others’ esteem (De 
Officiis 1.27.98). This implies, first, that personal beauty can still literally be seen in bodily 
movements and postures, for example a calm face. Second, a beautiful body is worth 
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cultivating, only not as a priority or a matter of fancy curls (Stoicorum Vetera Fragmenta 
1.248; Epictetus, Discourses 3.1.42–3; Seneca, Letter 124.22). It complicates both points that 
the Stoics suggest we consider human beauty a quality of a mind or soul quite distinct 
from ‘external’ things like the body itself. In a delicate position, bodily beauty follows yet 
easily distracts from the superior beauty of virtue (Bett 2010; Celkyte 2017).  
Amid these continuities with classical Greek thought, Roman philosophers under 
the influence of Stoicism place less accent than did their predecessors on the aesthetic 
character of virtue. Shifts from Greek to Latin are telling. While Cicero considers good 
conduct attractive, he translates kalos in ethical contexts by honestum, ‘honorable,’ rather 
than pulcher, formosus, or speciocus, varieties of ‘beautiful’ (on these terms, see Monteil 
1964). In Seneca, the Greek ideal of the kalos kagathos becomes simply the Roman ‘good 
man’ (vir bonus). The beauty (pulchritudo) of such a man’s soul would be amazing, (again) 
like the appearance of a god, Seneca states, if the soul could be seen (Letter 115.3–5). These 
choices render virtue less a matter of appearance. This tendency may be a result of Stoic 
psychology, a response to the spectacles of games and politics of the late Roman republic 
or, plausibly, both intertwined (Bartsch 1999). However these translations arise, they 
inflect later Roman thought and the interpretation of ancient Greek ethics (Setaioli 2008).  
Not all accept these philosophical transfers of beauty from body to soul. Two 
premier writers of Roman epigrams in the first-century BCE suggest a more popular 
perspective. One epigram of Philodemus of Gadara, an early follower of Epicureanism, 
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revels in the body parts of a young Italian woman from bottom to top: “Oh feet, oh 
calves... oh upper arms, oh breasts, oh the tapering neck, oh hands, oh–and I’m going 
mad–the eyes...” (Greek Anthology 5.132.1–4). This reaction has nothing to do with her 
origin, character, or refinement. “What if she is of Oscan origin,” this man wonders (l. 7): 
she may not even speak Latin or Greek!17 Catallus rejects the similar view of the many 
who judge one Quintia beautiful (formosa) on account of physical features alone. Her body 
is great in size (tam magno corpore), he concedes, she is fair-skinned, tall, and upright (all 
with social overtones), but to be beautiful a woman needs charm and wit, like his beloved 
Lesbia (venustas, sal; fr. 86).18 Two centuries later, David Konstan has argued (2014: 109–
10), the concept of beauty still shifts unstably among body and soul even as intellectuals 
praise its psychological reaches against the tide of common use. But applications of the 
concept have settled more squarely onto women. Cynic philosopher Dio Chrysotom, 
exiled in 82 CE from Rome and his birthplace in modern Turkey, might explain this 
conceptual fate by the twinned loss of handsome men and Greek values under the reign 
of Domitian (Oration 21.4–10).19  
 
17 This view resonates with the Epicureans’ corporealism, though it is difficult to know how or 
whether to interpret many of Philodemus’ epigrams in terms of his philosophical commitments. 
See Sider 1997: 32–9, 103–8. Cohen 1981 traces the head-to-toe description of Sarai (Sarah) in the 
Genesis Apocryphon, one of the Dead Sea Scrolls, to the influence of this epigram and both, in turn, 
to Near Eastern figurative descriptions of body parts, known to scholars by the Arabic waṣf.  
18 Compare Catallus fr. 51 on Lesbia, modelled after Sappho fr. 31 noted above. 
19 Greek, that is, as opposed to Persian. On cultural difference, see the contribution of Kelly 
Olson to this volume. 
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3. Later Antiquity 
Thinkers in the third, fourth, and fifth centuries ring significant changes on classical and 
Hellenistic notions of beauty. A prevalent tendency is to modify ideas of Plato’s, as 
interpreted and defended by his Platonist exponents, to support new conceptions of 
humanity and the divine afforded by Christianity. Judaic thinkers, such as Philo of 
Alexandria, had similarly drawn on Greco-Roman philosophy; medieval Islamic thinkers 
will do the same. Early Christian thinkers find in Platonism an amenable theological 
framework. In their view, the aim of human happiness remains to become godlike, but 
this becomes a matter of imitating Christ so that one can see the image of God in the 
beauty of Christ and in oneself. The crucial bridge between these two intellectual 
traditions, and among the first to make this turn toward ‘inner beauty,’ is Plotinus.  
Born in Egypt in 204/5 CE, a student at Alexandria and teacher at Rome, Plotinus 
describes in On Beauty (Ennead 1.6) how beauty in the world draws one toward the 
ultimate non-physical basis of reality and of one’s true nature. Like anything in the world, 
physical beauty is an image of what Plotinus calls a form located in intellect; this is what 
makes individual things intelligible. But physical beauty presents what it is an image of, 
much as your reflection in water shows you are there, too. Any beautiful body has form, 
but a beautiful human body has a particularly lively quality that shows the presence of 
soul (6.7.22). We are attracted and delighted because our soul, which also has form, 
recognizes something akin (1.6.2). This brief departs from the Stoics in two ways. First, 
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form is simple, not composite, so its beauty cannot depend upon proportions among 
parts and wholes. In turn, Plotinus argues, Stoics cannot explain what makes several 
things from gold and stars to virtue and knowledge beautiful (1.6.1). Second, Plotinus 
begins from the motivational role of beauty. He recovers from Plato a psychological 
concern with “how beauty works in attentive experience” (Miles 1999: 105) yet develops 
this ethical psychology through a novel view of what it means and how one comes to be 
a beautiful person. The goal is to grasp the cause of everything and all beauty, the One or 
the Good (Ennead 1.6.7). The way to do this is to look ‘within’ oneself. One must not 
pursue physical beauty unaware that it is an image. This would be, as in Ovid’s myth of 
Narcissus, like chasing one’s beautiful reflection in water (1.6.8). Instead, one must see 
the beauty of a good soul. How does one do that? Plato found this sight in lovers’ 
awestruck gazes. While invoking the Phaedrus, Plotinus interiorizes the exercise in a way 
that Plato could not:  
Go back into yourself [anage epi sauton] and look; and if you do not yet see yourself 
beautiful, then, just as a maker of a statue [an agalma] that must become beautiful 
cuts away here and polishes there... so you must cut away excess and straighten 
the crooked and clear the dark and make it bright and never stop ‘working on your 
statue’ until the godlike [theoeidēs] gleam of virtue shines upon you, until you see 
‘self-control standing on its sacred pedestal.’ (1.6.9, partially quoting Phaedrus 
252d, 254b)  
26 
 
Notice the language of removal. Plotinus advises this work of purification to separate 
oneself from one’s embodied condition as a human being and to identify oneself so far as 
possible with one’s true nature as intellect. To call this an ideal of human beauty is 
nonetheless useful, if slightly misleading, because Plotinus is interested in the tension of 
living rationally in the world and appreciating its value and beauty.20  
This position emerges against both Gnostic and early Christian views of the 
human situation. With origins in Judaic and early Christian sects, Gnosticism shares a 
belief in a transcendent and caring God but takes this to exclude that essential Christian 
belief in the incarnation of Jesus of Nazareth. By the second century, Gnostics are treated 
as heretical Christians. Plotinus treats them as perverted Platonists. For Gnostic writings, 
excavated in 1945 at Nag Hammadi in Egypt, claim that the physical world is the evil 
creation of an evil lesser deity entirely separate from God. This dichotomy opposes an 
ancient philosophical conviction that the cosmos is structured for good, producing the 
uniquely harsh position that human beauty is devious and despicable (Nag Hammadi 
Codex 1.1, 1.3, 2.5, 2.7).21 For Plotinus this dichotomy ignores the structure of reality 
(Ennead 2.9.17). For early Christians it ignores the revelation of God in Christ and, related, 
the need to affirm the body and bodily suffering. What links these tenets is the doctrine 
of resurrection, itself a fertile ground for imagining and reimagining human beauty.  
 
20 On the status of sensible beauty, contrast the perspectives of Dillon 1996 and Miles 1999: ch. 
2. Corrigan 2018 traces themes above from Plato to Platonism.  
21 An excellent introduction to Gnosticism is Pagels 1979.  
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Early Christian thinking is oriented from the narrative that Jesus of Nazareth was 
born, crucified, and resurrected three days later.22 That he was born makes him human; 
that he was resurrected makes Christ divine, God incarnate. This requires a new 
trinitarian way of thinking about the unity of God, as fourth-century bishop Hilary of 
Poitiers recognizes in The Trinity. It also requires a new way of thinking about human 
beings and human ideals. Church Fathers such as Clement of Alexandria in the second 
century and Gregory of Nyssa in the fourth emphasize that human beings are created in 
the image of God (Gen. 1:27). While this image pertains to the soul, a soul without a body 
is not a person; Christ is, after all, God in the flesh. So, already with the Apostle’s Creed, 
an early doctrinal statement, the hope for after death is not that the soul will be immortal, 
as in much ancient Greek thought, but that the body of a particular person, my body, will 
be resurrected together with the soul at the end of time. But for centuries early Christians 
debate what this implies. Which body will be resurrected? Will it be me at thirty or at 
eighty? As I hoped to look or with marks of imperfection? Will I need all my teeth? Or 
will I look gross without them?  
Such questions involve projecting a beautiful future self. Older notions of beauty 
could furnish answers. Some carry by now familiar socioeconomic weight. A body 
clothed in white robes, for example, conjures purity and cleanliness but also upper-class 
 
22 I have been especially helped in what follows by Wilken 2003. See also the sources collected 
in Thiessen 2005. A seminal study of these sources is Balthasar 1982.  
28 
 
virtue (Moss 2019: ch. 4). [Fig. 1.5] Others are more theoretical. In the fifth century, 
Augustine invokes the Stoics to argue that fat and thin people need not fear that they will 
be resurrected as they are because the resurrected body, being perfect, is beautiful and 
physical beauty depends on a well-proportioned body and a nice complexion. But what 
Augustine adds next we have not met, and it is distinctive of early Christian thought. 
Persecuted martyrs, he continues, will be resurrected complete with the scars of their 
wounds. Far from ugly, in those scars “the beauty of their valor will shine out, a beauty 
in the body and yet not of the body” (City of God 22.19). In this the martyrs imitate Christ, 
who becomes glorified through suffering, his ‘passion’ on the crucifix.23 This is not the 
glory of Achilles, nor Virgil’s Aeneus. When Christian poet Aurelius Clemens Prudentius 
praises the victory of the passion (tropaeum passionis), with blood and water miraculously 
flowing from Christ’s pierced side (Hymn for Every Hour 83–7 with John 19:34), martial 
valor is molded into quite a different cast of beautiful character.  
The basic idea is, as before, that one becomes like what one loves. But now, if Christ 
is fully human and fully divine, his exemplary beauty does not so much point toward or 
share in God’s beauty as realize it. This thought, which encourages physical contact with 
icons of Christ, bridges the gap between human and divine in Greek poetry and 
 
23 Cyril of Alexandria observes that Christ can become glorified only as a human being who 
suffers and overcomes death (Commentary on John 13:31–2).  
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philosophy and, more sharply, in Gnosticism.24 [Fig. 1.6] It diverges also from the Hebrew 
Bible, which centres the concept of beauty, or the closest corresponding adjective yapheh 
 :on human beings, especially their eyes, hair, skin, and flawless bodies (Olyan 2008 ,(יפה)
ch. 1; Penchansky 2013). 24F25 The question becomes: why must one become like Christ to 
become beautiful if one is already made in his image? The answer, in a word, is sin. Like 
a face depicted on a dirty coin, the image of God in us has been obscured; the soul, like 
the coin, must be cleaned both to see the image and to become beautiful. These two 
outcomes come together, Augustine makes clear. While Augustine’s views of beauty 
evolve from and owe debts to Stoicism and Platonism, his mature Christian thought 
follows a general structure (Harrison 1992). 25F26 Human beauty (formosa) derives from the 
image, the being or form (forma), of God. Therefore, to turn one’s will away from God is 
a disgrace (deformatio) whose repair (reformatio) consists in redirecting love primarily 
toward God. Augustine is deeply ambivalent whether the beauties of creation, including 
another person, can provoke this conversion. A surer path, in the footsteps of Plotinus, is 
to turn inward to seek beauty within and know oneself (Confessions 7.17.23, 10.6.8–10). 
Otherwise, one cannot properly see even the beauty of another. The suffering of Christ is 
 
24 This necessarily simplifies debates about incarnation, image, and iconography. See Schönborn 
1994.  
25 One of the most intriguing sources is the Song of Songs. On the relation there of beauty to dark 
skin (1:5) and its early Christian reception, see Scott 2006. Konstan 2014: 136–47, to whom I owe 
the reference to Olyan 2008, triangulates the biblical Hebrew terms with their Greek and Latin 
translations.  
26 A comprehensive study in French is Fontanier 2008. 
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again paradigmatic. Whereas his executioners think him corrupt and disgrace his body 
because their souls are disgraceful, those conformed to Christ are able to see the beauty 
of his righteousness (Expositions on the Psalms 32.2, 44.3). Not only must one look with the 
right kind of love to see beauty clearly. Augustine’s point is that such a love makes one 
beautiful. If this ideal cannot be fully attained until the resurrection in the afterlife, in this 
life beauty beckons one to see, to know, to love more truly. Abstract ideas may not convey 
all of what this means. But we may take heart in the words of Augustine: “Give me a 
lover and he will feel what I am saying” (Tractates on the Gospel of John 26.4).   
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Exterior of terracotta water jug (hydria/kalpis) attributed to the Washing Painter, c. 430–20 
BCE, h. 12 1/4 in. (31.1 cm); diameter 9 1/8 in. (23.2 cm), Metropolitan Museum of Art 
Accession 22.139.25. A seated woman is surrounded by a small Eros and wedding 
paraphernalia, indicating that she is a bride. An attendant in front of her holds a fan. 









Roman marble sarcophagus fragment, c. second century CE with sixteenth-century 
restorations. Reconstructed 38 1/8 in. × 8 3/4 in. × 46 7/8 in. (96.8 × 22.2 × 119.1 cm), 
Metropolitan Museum of Art 20.187. The dying Greek hero Meleager is carried home by 
his grieving father and companions. This scene became a model for Renaissance 



















Tondo of an Attic red-figure cup by the Euaion Painter. Banquet scene: man reclining on 
a bench and youth playing the aulos. Tondo of an Attic red-figure cup, ca 460–50 BCE. 
Diameter: 31.1 cm (12 in.). Located in the Musée du Louvre, Paris, France. (Photo by VCG 
Wilson/Corbis via Getty Images) 
 









Marble statue called Doryphoros (spear-bearer) of Pompeii, Roman copy of a Greek 



























Roman or Byzantine medallion with Christ as miracle worker, glass with gold leaf, c. 300–
500, 13/16 x 1 x 3/16 in. (2.1 x 2.5 x 0.5 cm), Metropolitan Museum of Art 18.145.8. Some 
early popular depictions of Christ draw on Roman images of magicians. The medallion 
was probably inset into jewelry.  
 
 
 
 
